SoK: Making Sense of Censorship Resistance Systems
Sheharbano Khattak*, Tariq Elahi*, Laurent Simon, Colleen M. Swanson, Steven J. Murdoch, and Ian Goldberg
Abstract: An increasing number of countries implement Internet censorship at different scales and for a variety of reasons. Several censorship resistance systems (CRSs) have emerged to help bypass such blocks. The diversity of the censor’s attack landscape has led to an arms race, leading to a dramatic speed of evolution of CRSs. The inherent complexity of CRSs and the breadth of work in this area makes it hard to contextualize the censor’s capabilities and censorship resistance strategies. To address these challenges, we conducted a comprehensive survey of CRSs—deployed tools as well as those discussed in academic literature—to systematize censorship resistance systems by their threat model and corresponding defenses. To this end, we first sketch a comprehensive attack model to set out the censor’s capabilities, coupled with discussion on the scope of censorship, and the dynamics that influence the censor’s decision. Next, we present an evaluation framework to systematize censorship resistance systems by their security, privacy, performance and deployability properties, and show how these systems map to the attack model. We do this for each of the functional phases that we identify for censorship resistance systems: communication establishment, which involves distribution and retrieval of information necessary for a client to join the censorship resistance system; and conversation, where actual exchange of information takes place. Our evaluation leads us to identify gaps in the literature, question the assumptions at play, and explore possible mitigations.
In Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies.
For the full paper visit: http://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/popets.2016.2016.issue-4/popets-2016-0028/popets-2016-0028.xml
A Framework for the Game-theoretic Analysis of Censorship Resistance
Tariq Elahi, John A. Doucette, Hadi Hosseini, Steven J. Murdoch, and Ian Goldberg
Abstract: We present a game-theoretic analysis of optimal solutions for interactions between censors and censorship resistance systems (CRSs) by focusing on the data channel used by the CRS to smuggle clients’ data past the censors. This analysis leverages the inherent errors (false positives and negatives) made by the censor when trying to classify traffic as either legitimate or as CRS traffic, as well as the underlying rate of CRS traffic. We identify Nash equilibrium solutions for several simple censorship scenarios and then extend those findings to more complex scenarios where we find that the deployment of a censorship apparatus does not qualitatively change the equilibrium solutions, but rather only affects the amount of traffic a CRS can support before being blocked. By leveraging these findings, we describe a general framework for exploring and identifying optimal strategies for the censorship circumventor, in order to maximize the amount of CRS traffic not blocked by the censor. We use this framework to analyze several censor types in scenarios with multiple data-channel protocols used as cover for the CRS. We show that it is possible to gain insights through this framework even without perfect knowledge of the censor’s (secret) values for the parameters in their utility function.
Technical Report 2015-11, CACR, 2015.
To see the full paper visit: http://cacr.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2015/cacr2015-11.pdf